This article illustrates a gap between popular narratives of game development in design texts and the reality of day-to-day development, drawing from an ethnographic account of intern developers to highlight the potential contributions of studio studies to both game scholars and aspiring developers. It describes three take-aways. The first is that developers have difficulty articulating their work to others, impacting how we learn, teach, and talk about development, including how we share knowledge across domains. The second is that negotiation with technology rather than mastery characterizes the daily work of new developers, and the third is that problems frequently arise in articulating and aligning the normally black-boxed work of individual developers. Resolution of these issues commonly depends on 'soft' social skills, yet, external pressures on developers mean they tidy up and professionalize accounts of their daily practice, thus both social conflict and 'soft' skills have a tendency to disappear. The discussion section reflects further upon why 'soft and squishy' socio-material accounts are largely absent from scholarly and industry discourses, and how the experiences of the interns studied link to more general understandings of game development. Not surprisingly, the reality of developing a game as a team is much more complex and messy than expected or planned for, and further studio studies may help us better understand recurring game design problems. The disconnect between discourse and daily practice has key implications, as what game scholars and educators think we know about game development shapes how we speak about game developers.
make games. 1 This paper intends to incite more conversation about the skills we emphasize and impart. Finally, this paper is written for those who may have no desire to make games but are simply interested in games culture. Ethnographic approaches and studio studies are valuable to Game Studies, not only because they may help developers improve their craft, illustrating the varied contexts of and approaches to game making, but also because they highlight how both game scholars and developers approach their work with idealized preconceptions about game development roles, processes, practices, and values. These assumptions shape what game academics and game makers both see, how they talk, how they work, and the scholarly and cultural discourse around games that results. Drawing upon fieldwork, I suggest that the rationalized, often technical, individualized, and 'authorial' accounts predominating much of game development discourse, from textbooks to post-mortems to designer interviews and presentations, can miss where the real action is: the (often messy) socio-material negotiations between team members and their technologies.
Learning what Game Development Looks Like
To unpack pre-conceptions about development, it's important to first outline how game scholars commonly learn about developers, the strengths of these accounts, and what may be left out. Before gaining access to game studios, my own three windows into game development were textbooks on game design, developer postmortems, and academic accounts of game development. Each differently shaped what I thought development was supposed to look like.
Game Design textbooks
For most interested in game development, textbooks on game design are a primary resource. For me, this included Schell's (2008) A Book of Lenses, Fullerton's (2008) In order to appeal to a broad audience, at differing levels of expertise, these texts offer an ideal, generalized blueprint and are largely technology-agnostic. Their lessons are applicable regardless of team size, game genre, development environment and tools, game engine and target platform.
Universal takeaways predominate, although small case studies and reflections on designing on specific game features commonly add flavor.
Fullerton and Schell, in particular, helpfully outline development roles/tasks and core skill sets, mapping out the structures of teams and studios, and their connections from production to the larger games network of publishers, distributers, platforms and marketers. This clear and
unambiguous mapping of what seem to be discrete roles, responsibilities, tasks and hierarchies in mainstream development framed how I thought game development worked: ideally, projects are driven by a designer's (or design team's) authorial intent and directives. Production is characterized by seamless coordination, individuals and disciplines working together (i.e. artists, programmers, sound engineers, designers), each enabled by domain-specific knowledge, assisted by sophisticated and powerful computer technologies, making individual contributions to a factory-like pipeline of content that becomes the final game. While essential orienting texts, these birds-eye view, by necessity, cannot linger on ground-level messes, conflicts and development dead-ends. Wanting detail on the ground level 'dirt' the textbook idealizations don't show, I turned to developer postmortems and other public accounts.
Postmortems
Game postmortems are written from the perspective of key members of the development team and reflect on what went wrong and what went right during the development process of a single game.
Here, they offer insider detail on the messiness and contingency lacking in textbooks, focusing on perceived moments of conflict. 2 Despite the situated, project-specific detail, postmortems follow markedly similar scripts, citing repetitive issues with feature creep and scoping (attempting to create a game too large for the team size), scheduling (delivering the game on time), management issues, budget overruns, and the nearly universal crunch (extended, largely unremunerated working hours to meet deadlines) (Petrillo, Pimenta, Trindade, & Dietrich, 2009; Shirinian, 2011) .
The simple fact that these topics are commonly covered in texts, yet they continually recur, is a clear indicator that something more complicated is going on underneath the oft-repeated advice to "get better at scoping and planning". I argue that solutions lie in social, rather than technological, domains.
In their own analysis of postmortems, Petrillo et al. conclude that the focus on scope and feature creep indicate "traditional and game software industries do not suffer from technological problems, but from managerial ones" and that postmortems are "basically made up stories in everyday language" following similar, culturally approved scripts (2009, pp. 13.19-13.20) . In short, postmortems tend to detail the same messes, and may not offer any replicable solutions. This is because postmortems, while ostensibly offering other developers a peek into their studio practices and problem-solving, are also a public relations tool used to attract players to the game, employees to the studio, and future financial partners and publishers. Thus, what is said within them is highly structured and constrained. As noted by O'Donnell, important aspects of the development process are intentionally left out of postmortems: "Because many companies think that they might be giving away secrets, or because the documents must be cleared by legal departments, they frequently contain few details" (2009, p. 3.8 Because postmortems didn't tell me how developers and their technologies interacted on a typical day, I turned to a third source, studio studies and ethnographies of developers.
Scholarly accounts of development
The materiality of game development -and depictions of just how developers interact with each other and their tools -has not been a core focus of Game Studies until recently (Kultima, 2015 (Kultima, , 2018 In Game Studies there is a larger material turn characterized by interdisciplinary scholarship and an "increased concern for the contexts, uses and material qualities of games technologies on the one hand, as well as attentiveness to the situated analysis of play and players on the other" (Apperley & Jayemane, 2012, p. 7) . Apperley and Jayemane divide this Material Turn into three intersecting bodies of literatures: ethnographies of games and players (see, for example, Humphreys, Fitzgerald, Banks, & Suzor, 2005; Taylor, 2006b; Chen, 2012) , digital labour, particularly the study of user-created content, known colloquially as "playbour" (see Kücklich, 2005; Postigo, 2003; Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009) , and platform studies. Platform studies unpacks the black box of game platforms, examining how the material computational limits of software and hardware platforms such as the Atari, the Wii, and Flash, shape and influence design decisions, thus impacting the player experience (see Montfort & Bogost, 2009) . It thus aligns with the larger umbrella of software studies and the study of how 'cultural' and 'computer' layers of new media interpenetrate and influence each other.
Despite this material turn, platform studies methodologies are largely grounded in interviews, archival histories, and the deconstructions of hardware itself rather than day-to-day accounts.
Studies depicting the everyday reality of game development are relatively rare (see Banks, 2013; O'Donnell, 2014; Ash, 2015; Malaby, 2009; Whitson, 2017) . Due to the secrecy of the game industry and concerns about inadvertent leaking of trade secrets, access to these sites is largely prohibited -particularly for humanities and social science scholars lacking programming skills (Nieborg, 2011) . However, some researchers have had considerable success accessing smallerscale, independent sites of production, 'indie' development (Browne, 2015) . In particular, Fisher and Harvey's (2013) work on women's game-making initiatives and the conflict that arises within them illuminates some of the politically-charged realities of game production. This body of work contributes to a growing emphasis on studio studies, which focuses on the material and situated contexts of production, fostering a deeper understanding of how cultural artefacts are brought into being, and evidencing how creativity operates as a located practice (Farías & Wilkie, 2015 (Whitson, 2017) . This work on developers and non-human actors parallels and complements existing scholarship on players, examining how game mods and bots exert in-game agency (De Paoli & Kerr, 2009; Taylor, 2006a) . Games do not exist in and of themselves -they are not just rules embedded in hardware, but are also constituted by and operate in conjunction with players (Steinkuehler, 2006; Taylor, 2009) . The resulting game is a mangling of human and material agencies (Pickering, 1995) , just as game development itself is a constitutive entanglement of the social and material: a creative assemblage of game developers and the software they use, of white boards, headphones, sticky notes, and wikipages.
Methodology
Before moving to a case study illustrating what we may learn from watching developers at work, it's important to note that the specific study site and methods shape what we see. The vignettes for this article were collected during fieldwork in the summer of 2012 with ten intern developers at a large multinational game studio in Canada, which I refer to by the pseudonym, PlayHouse. The ten-week program was a collaboration between the studio and an academic funding network, who financed travel and lodging and assisted with student recruiting. The program was conceived with two goals in mind: assisting student participants develop core competencies, aspirations, and careers in game design, and providing greater knowledge about interdisciplinary collaborative practices. According to PlayHouse's Creative Director, who led the program, rather than creating a commercial game the end goal was educational -experimenting with new internship models and educational partnerships.
The team was composed of three artists, three designers, three programmers, and one producer who I refer to using pseudonyms. Project roles were as follows: Jesse (2D art), Erin (3D art) Sam (rigging and animation), Max (narrative design), Nathan (game design), Alex (sound design),
Martin (lead programmer), Kevin (system/tools programmer), Clark (AI programmer), and Tyrone (producer). While these roles are commonly found in game development, typically artists and programmers would outnumber designers. Participants each took on additional content development tasks beyond their primary roles, which were reflected in their final game credits. In terms of their previous training and experience with games, eight of the participants were working on or had just completed postgraduate degrees, while the remaining two had just completed their 3rd year of their respective undergraduate degree programs. Three had programing backgrounds, three had art and animation backgrounds, while the remaining four members had backgrounds spanning history, dance, cinema studies and linguistics. Most, but not all, had experience working on capstone game projects.
Unlike other internships where individuals are placed into apprenticeship roles and given more discrete tasks, the team was given autonomy: they were shown an existing game prototype, walked through it by the two designers, and were asked to use that game as a rough template, designing a new game using the Unity game engine along with graphics software 3D Studio Max. PlayHouse provided office space, infrastructure (chairs, computers, software) and mentorship, including intensive training in the first week about how internal studio pipelines and production processes are structured, and group instruction sessions on communication and project management tools.
Progress was evaluated by PlayHouse's Creative Director with weekly playtests and feedback sessions. Throughout the ten weeks, interns met one-on-one with senior programmers, artists, designers, and producers for more domain-specific guidance.
I and another ethnographer followed the project team for the entire period. Our research protocol included semi-structured entry and exit interviews with participants and PlayHouse employees, each of which lasted between thirty minutes and an hour. We also observed the development process, taking part in team meetings and scrums, sitting with individual team members at their desks, and noting their daily work flows. This was supplemented by access to various back-channel communications, including access to the team's Facebook, skype, and the project wiki page. Our observations took the form of field notes, audio and visual recordings, and photographs, and were coded and analysed using an iterative process throughout the ten weeks (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) .
I attuned to the ebbs and flows of everyday development, watching how developers learned and became professionalized in terms of how they spoke about their work and how they took on what they perceived as industry practices. This necessarily frames the interpretation that follows.
Studio studies commonly focus on commercial production practices within large, hierarchically organized professional teams (see O'Donnell, 2014) , illustrating the pipelines and production practices for console and PC games, otherwise referred to as AAA production. However, contemporary production practices have become increasingly heterogeneous in the networked era, exhibiting considerable variation in terms of team size and composition, business models, timelines and budgets, market, and infrastructure (Kerr, 2017) . The so-called "democratization of development" facilitated by low cost tools and online distribution means that more and more games are made by "everyone else": amateurs and hobbyists, students and indies, researchers and artists, operating outside of the commercial mainstream industry. These practices are not yet welldocumented. Teams are often smaller, organized in a 'flat' rather than hierarchical manner, and multitask rather than occupy the discrete roles depicted in textbook organizational charts. In this study, the team was structured as a hybrid between traditional studio apprenticeships and the DIY autonomy of fledgling indie teams. While the team didn't face the financial pressures endemic to commercial studios, other commonalities included the large scope, the tight timeline (which they met), and the sense that potential future employment rested upon their performance. In hindsight, if we were to evaluate the project in terms of educational and employment outcomes, after graduation, all ten participants immediately went on to work in games. Half a decade on, only one (Alex) no longer works in or around games. Tyrone runs a small independent studio, Erin teaches design at a college level, Clark, Nathan, Martin, and Kevin work at mid-size game studios, Max works at an interactive design firm, and Jesse and Sam are freelance artists. Thus we can assume that the project was at least, in part, successful.
From an STS perspective, studying interns rather than professional developers is a methodological artifact. It gives us access to developer culture in a way that is otherwise difficult -allowing us to see how aspiring developers struggling with mundane messy reality of work try and balance that reality with preconceived notions about what game development should look like. It's important to reiterate that this project set-up is not "normal" for professional studios. A large team of developers creating a game for commercial distribution with a mix of more senior and junior developers would be structured and behave quite differently, leading to different takeaways than the three I illustrate below. While the interns' experiences might differ from most large multinational studios, their struggles mirror those faced by growing number of small studios, particularly those composed of graduates unable to find employment in the mainstream industry.
For example, the ESAC reports that there are 596 studios in Canada, growing 21% from 2015 to 2017. The vast majority of these (496) have 25 employees or less, emphasizing the rapid growth of small independent studios (Entertainment Software Association of Canada, 2017). Given the growth of studios of all sizes, much further work must be done to illustrate how practices differ from site to site, highlighting the range of different practices emerging beyond large-scale commercial development.
Snapshots from the Field:

Learning to become a game developer
In this section I begin addressing why learning about development (and how to become a developer) can be difficult, by using a number of brief vignettes from the field. I focus on three points. The first is that learning to make games is emergent, embodied and context-dependent, leading to challenges with teaching others and sharing knowledge. The second is that negotiation with technology, rather than mastery over it, characterizes intern developers' work. However, for better or worse, external pressures on developers mean they sanitize and professionalize accounts of their daily practice. The third is that problems frequently arise in articulating and aligning the normally black-boxed work of individual developers. Resolution of these issues commonly depends on 'soft' social skills, otherwise referred to as heterogeneous engineering (Law, 1987 she is doing and why, and 2) for Max, hands-on learning is time consuming, but more effective than verbal and visual walkthroughs. This is in line with Orlikowski's (2002 Orlikowski's ( , 2007 work on how knowledge is generated and shared in organizations. Orlikowski argues that knowledge and practice mutually constitute each other. "Knowing" is not some static property that can be separated from practice or simply embedded in some immutable mobile object (Latour, 1986) , such as a game engine, or textbook, and transferred to a new community. To support her argument, she reviews multiple approaches to understanding knowledge, starting with Polanyi's (1966) distinction between tacit and explicit knowing. involved, yet performed rapidly and without deliberation when her hands are on the keyboard and drawing tablet. She struggled in expressing just what she was doing, and why, thus making the transfer of skills difficult as she could not distill intuitive actions into general rules, guidelines, or series of steps. Instead, she allowed the machine to prompt her, creating something start-to-finish, having Max follow along. To teach, artists on the team 'felt' their way through the software, haltingly verbalizing what they were doing each moment and thus developing guidelines along the way. In parallel to this "conversation with software" example, the narrative design of the game was also situated and collectively accomplished via bouncing ideas back and forth between three team members, who used prompts such as images, play-throughs and references to other games.
From this, it could be posited that knowing how to make games is inherent in action. Knowing is implicit, spontaneous and intuitive, and it is only achieved via making games themselves, a practice which we can see emulated in the larger pedagogical shift to 'experiential learning' and capstone group project courses in education. In game development circles, this learning is encapsulated by the emphasis on game jams as skill development, and the oft-repeated advice to aspiring developers: 'Don't go to school. Just go make games' (see Stuart, 2014 Software tools are vital to collaboration processes, focusing and aligning the interests and productivity of team members who may not share a common goal or disciplinary knowledge.
These tools channel agents' activities in pre-formatted directions, allowing for one's local understanding (i.e. an artist on a game development team) to be reframed in the context of some wider collective activity (i.e. collaborative game-making) despite the lack of a shared language, skillset or even consensus with other teammates on what the final project should look like. As such, software such as Unity and 3D Studio Max act as boundary objects (Star & Griesemer, 1989) , that are plastic enough to be interpreted differently across communities, but contain enough immutable content to maintain integrity. Despite these tools being an obligatory passage point and uniting agent on the team, the software is often a site of breakdown, as with the inexplicable dent in the car door. So far, the two vignettes can be read largely in terms learning to become a developer via situated practice, and learning how to collaborate with -as well as coax more out of -one's machines. As the following vignette demonstrates, the hardest-learned skills were deeply social: the ability understand the work of others, co-ordinate activities, and -in response to conflict -pull the sociotechnical assemblage of people and their technologies back into some sense of alignment.
Heterogeneous Engineering in Game Development
During the course of the internship, problems commonly arose at articulation points where the normally black-boxed work of individuals was brought forth and integrated together. Effective resolution of these issues is dependent on 'soft' social skills. Key members of the team play an important role in finding alternative routes when the software resisted, employing numerous social and technical tactics and strategies to finish the game on schedule. Some actors have a more privileged relationship within the team, largely due to their perceived familiarity with the development software and their ability to coax it into alignment. Those, like Martin, are called on to shoulder an additional burden of work on top of their own assigned tasks as they channel and remove the 'gremlins' from other people's machines. Because of the interdependencies of artifacts created during the development process (e.g. code and assets), configuration management tools are used, allowing team members to work in isolation on one small part of the game (e.g. the AI for a non-player character, or a 3D model and texture for an in-game object) and then, once finished, re-integrate their product into the greater whole, ensuring that it doesn't 'break the build' or create bugs. This is achieved using a number of additional software tools such as task managers, Martin sighs. He asks Erin a question about her using her "repo", which is shorthand for code repository. By this reference, he is indicating she should use version control software to access an earlier, working copy of the game until he has time to address the problem. In response, Erin looks confused. She decides not to load the level, verbally noting that she has other stuff to work on.
Martin heads back to his desk, frustrated at the seemingly wasted tutorial. Sighing heavily, he looks up to the ceiling and shakes his head. He grabs his hair, which is long, dark, and tied back in a ponytail. This body language is like a whole-body eye roll aimed in Erin's direction. Visibly frustrated, he decides to drop what he's doing.
"I need to get back to the AI since it's holding everybody up and NOBODY bothered
to tell me." Martin abandons his own tasks to return to the unfinished work that prevented Erin from loading a current version of the game. However, he soon interrupts this work to offer a work-around solution for Jesse, suggesting he use a shader on his art asset to minimize the appearance of, but not get rid of, the white outlines. More negotiation ensues as Jesse resists, stating that final version wouldn't look professional in his artist portfolio.
Later, when I ask Erin for clarification on why she gave up testing, she admits that she doesn't understand how the version control system works, but didn't want to take Martin's time to have him explain it. The team view is that Martin's expertise with Unity is precious. "You don't want to take more of his time than necessary, as he already has so much to do". Indeed, Martin stays in the office until nearly midnight, working hours after Jesse and Erin have left.
Martin's value on the team is tied not just to technological expertise, but to the ability to simultaneously visualize and coordinate the activities of different team members. Job specialization on a game development team means that members are able to 'black box' the work of others, not worrying about how individual elements are made and incorporated into the larger game, but still relying on the products of their labours. The better the work is done, the less visible it is to those who benefit from it. However, Martin's role as a 'fixer' means that he must bring such work forward, from art to programming, to design, and render it visible in order to solve technical issues. A large part of his time is spent on these efforts, rather than his own specific tasks.
Martin is performing articulation work (Strauss, 1988) , moving from desk to desk and problemsolving in order to ensure that all the game assets can be taken from individual developers and successfully re-compiled back into a working version of the game. While balancing his own software engineer role, he is helping other developers troubleshoot, isolating the cause-and-effect sequences of what caused the unexpected software behaviour, and through trial-and-error experimentation demystifying recalcitrant machines and coaxing them back into alignment.
However, the software often remains recalcitrant, leaving Martin to convince team members like Jesse to abandon resistant technology and instead find alternative routes.
John Law (1987) uses the term 'heterogeneous engineering' to refer to the social and material work required to arrange human and nonhumans into a stable artefact. Referencing Law, Lucy
Suchman's ethnography of a bridge-building project evidences how even the most material artifacts (e.g. steel girders spanning a river) are constructed via persuasive performances. She details the social organization work done by various stakeholders who rely upon and reflexively constitute all the different elements that need to be aligned in order for such a massive building project to take place: "The work of designing a bridge, on this view, is as much a matter of storytelling as of analysis, calculation, and work with concrete and steel" (2000, p. 311). In
Suchman's account, the material engineering work of designing and building a steel bridge (e.g.
coming up with an efficient load-bearing design) is arguably a minor challenge compared to the social organization work of negotiating a solution that serves to protect local wildlife (from harvest mice to smelt fish), meets diametrically opposed budget, seismic, safety and traffic flow constraints, and enrolls local citizens who loudly reject the new bridge-building initiative as well as multiple municipal and federal works departments who have vested interests in alternative projects. In short, heterogeneous engineering is what resolved the largest challenges on the bridge project.
Like the work of designing a bridge, designing the digital spaces we inhabit can be as much a matter of storytelling and aligning diverse interests as it is of analysis, calculation, and work with code and pixels. Finishing this game was about keeping the wheels on the team: "Each one of us is an arrangement. That arrangement is more or less fragile. There are ordering processes which keep (or fail to keep) that arrangement on the road. And some of those processes, though precious few, are partially under our control some of the time" (Law, as cited by Suchman, 2000, p 311 ).
Importantly, when boundary objects such as game software fall apart and fail to unite the social worlds of their members, then other means of creating cooperation arise, including silencing, fragmentation, coercion. Alternatively, social coordination work and heterogenous engineering are employed to re-align the team: allies are recruited and disciplined, while options are narrowed in order to get the team together and back on the road.
Martin, and the producer, Tyrone, brought the products of the different team members together in a way that created a more stable artifact. Other members struggled. They could readily master their own domain but ran into problems when they were asked to co-ordinate and collaborate their efforts, or work with other team members. Specifically, it was Tyrone that was attributed by others in their exit interviews for delivering a game on time and within scope, and holding the project and its members together. Heterogeneous engineers, with the abilities to bridge the different worlds of art, design, and programming worlds, aligning both technical and social, were thus valued by other team members. On paper, coming from a humanities computing background, Tyrone did not have any "essential" skills beyond sound design. By his own account, he took on the producer role as no one else wanted it. Along the way, he picked up any and all odd tasks that were behind schedule. Imminently approachable, the first person in the office and the last to leave, and quick to highlight his own shortcomings, Tyrone became the glue that held the team together, particularly when conflict ensued.
If we conceptualize knowing how to make games as an enacted capability, we see that game design competencies are not fixed or given properties that reside within developers. Rather they are constituted daily by ongoing and situated practices. Tyrone was the team 'MVP' not because of inherent programming or art or design knowledge, but because he was the right 'fit' for these specific team members. Keeping the end goal and weekly milestones in mind, he was able to interpret individual concerns, spot bottlenecks, pitch in and shepherd lagging members, and cajole or persuade those who had gone 'off track' back into alignment. Whereas developers such as Erin hesitated to "waste" Martin's time, they didn't hesitate to seek technical and moral support from Problems were explained in terms of individualized properties (e.g. human error, lack of skill) or breakdowns in the system (e.g. bugs, equipment malfunctions) rather than failures in co-ordination or social conflict, presenting a rationalized account of what when wrong and why. For example, without fail, when asked to recount the problems and challenges of development, the internsregardless of whether they were artists, designers or programmers, provided a list of steps they took to isolate, replicate, and find the source of technical problems. Challenges in development were depicted as technical, rather than social, and were solved via technical means. difficult to write about and make generalizations from, thus partly explaining why textbooks cannot replace first-hand experience in game studios. This difficulty also shapes how we learn, teach, and even describe development work and thus share knowledge across domains. Not surprisingly, the reality of developing a game as a team is much more complex and messy than expected or planned for, thus contributing to recurring game design problems, such as scoping failure, feature-creep, budget and schedule overruns, overwork and interpersonal conflicts.
While intern accounts of development often emphasize technological mastery, in my own experience, negotiating with -rather than mastering -technology was a common occurrence, but one I did not expect: in order to develop a functioning game on time and feature-complete, intern developers quickly learned to hack solutions, try alternate routes, or simply disguise or abandon glitching assets, such as in the case of the car door. Drawing from later fieldwork with ten small studios and two games incubators, developers with more experience are speedier at recognizing familiar issues, finding workarounds, and identifying who they can go to address them. However, negotiations with technology are not restricted to interns. For example, more complex architectures such as in-house engines that have been added to by multiple developers over time, or code written by developers long-since gone are specific sites of negotiation.
Beyond the technology itself, 'soft and squishy' skills were acknowledged as important to problem-solving and team functioning, however these same skills, and resources for building these skills, aren't as well-developed in the literature about game development. For example, while tutorials and texts on level design, game feel, AI programming, and marketing abound, there seems to be a lack of resources for aspiring game developers in terms of collaboration, coordination, and conflict-resolution. As more graduates of development programs launch teams of their own, they miss out on 'apprenticing' in established studios where they can watch and model the practices of experienced developers. Instead, they must learn by trial and error -and without the safety net of an employee salary.
Thus, while we may learn about development from textbooks, actual development experiences are far from textbook, requiring skills that are not often spoken about. An increased focus on the situated context of game development might help address some of these issues and direct more attention to skill-building in areas such as problem-solving, social coordination, and interacting within complex human-machine assemblages.
